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Commodious Knowledge
Abstract
This paper offers a novel account of the value of knowledge.
The account is novel insofar as it advocates a shift in focus from
the value of individual items of knowledge to the value of the
commodity of knowledge. It is argued that the commodity of
knowledge is valuable in at least two ways: (i) in a wide range
of areas, knowledge is our way of being in cognitive contact
with the world and (ii) for us the good life is a life rich enough
in knowledge.
1 Introduction
We care a lot about knowledge. As a society, we invest a lot of time
and energy in the development of institutions whose aim it is to accu-
mulate or distribute knowledge. Universities, schools, libraries and
the internet are among the most prominent of these. On an individ-
ual level, we send our children to school and encourage them to go
to university so that they can acquire knowledge about a wide range
of topics. Some of us go to considerable financial lengths in order to
make this possible. Finally, in philosophy, the study of knowledge
has historically received a great deal of attention. A lot of effort has
been made to get clear on what exactly is involved in knowing.
From a philosophical point of view, the fact that we seem to care
so much about knowledge gives rise to a number of interesting ques-
tions: First, is our concern with knowledge warranted? In other
words, does knowledge have value that is special at least in the sense
that it would warrant this concern? Second, in what respect(s) exactly
is knowledge valuable?
These two questions are closely related. If knowledge does have
the kind of value that would warrant our concern with it, then we
may expect there to be a story about the specific respect(s) in which
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knowledge is valuable. The first question thus naturally gives rise
to the second. On the other hand, an answer to the second question
will allow us to make progress towards answering the first question.
After all, if we have an account of the respect(s) in which knowledge
is valuable, we will be better positioned to assess whether the value
that attaches to knowledge warrants our concern with it.
The aim of this paper is to provide novel answers to both of the
above mentioned questions. More specifically, we will try to develop
a novel way in which knowledge is valuable, thereby answering the
second question. In addition, we will argue that, as a result, the
first question also receives a positive answer: the novel way in which
knowledge is valuable serves to vindicate our concern with it.
2 The Value Problem
2.1 Two Challenges
What does it take to provide a satisfactory answer to the question
whether knowledge has value that is special enough to warrant our
concern with it? There are a number of proposed answers in the lit-
erature. They differ from one another in the strength of the demands
imposed.
Let’s begin with what is widely regarded as the most lenient pro-
posal, which dates back as far as Plato’s Meno. To begin with, notice
that it is nearly universally accepted that knowledge requires true be-
lief.1 Now suppose it turns out that knowledge is in no respect more
valuable than true belief that isn’t knowledge, i.e. mere true belief. In
that case it would seem wrong to care about knowledge rather than
mere true belief. Our special concern with knowledge would seem
misplaced. This motivates a first constraint on satisfactory accounts
of the value of knowledge:
[C1] Any satisfactory account of the value of knowledge must explain why
knowledge is in some respect more valuable than mere true belief.
Some have claimed that simply meeting C1 won’t be enough to
give a satisfactory account of the value of knowledge. Jonathan Kvan-
vig, for one, argues that more is needed: Suppose knowledge consists
of a set of constituents. Suppose, next, it turns out that knowledge
1 Notable exceptions are David Lewis [1996] and Colin Radford [1966] who have
denied that knowledge requires belief and Allan Hazlett [2010] who has challenged
the thesis that knowledge is factive.
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is in no respect more valuable than some proper subset of its con-
stituents. In that case it would be wrong to care specifically about
knowledge rather than the proper subset of equally valuable con-
stituents. Our special concern with knowledge would still seem mis-
placed. In view of these considerations, Kvanvig favours the follow-
ing constraint:
[C2] Any satisfactory account of the value of knowledge must explain why
knowledge is in some respect more valuable than any proper subset of
its constituents [Kvanvig 2003: xii-xiii].
2.2 Riggs’s Requirement
It has widely been taken for granted that the task of explaining
the value of knowledge consists in showing that individual items of
knowledge are more valuable than individual beliefs that fall short
of knowledge. Wayne Riggs, for one, is very clear about this when
he proposes that the best way to understand C2 is as follows:
(∀s)(∀p)[Value (sKp) > Value (sRp)] (where R is some relation
comprising elements of K, and R ̸= K)
[Riggs 2009: 334]
Roughly, the idea here is that in order to meet C2 we need to show
that it is better for one to know that p than to have a belief that p that
falls short of knowledge, for all propositions p.
While the challenge Riggs unpacks in the above quote is of course
C2, it is not hard to see that C1 can be given the same treatment:
for all propositions p, knowledge that p must be more valuable than
mere true belief that p. Key to this way of fleshing out the challenges
is that they require showing that every item of knowledge is more
valuable than the corresponding belief that falls short of knowledge.
(In what follows, we will refer to this requirement as ‘Riggs’s require-
ment’.)
Let’s get one thing out of the way: Everything we will say in this
paper is compatible with the idea that that knowledge is valuable in
a way that satisfies Riggs’s requirement. By way of explanation, con-
sider first the following distinction between two types of value: final
and instrumental.2 For something to be finally valuable is for it to be
2 For more on different types of value see e.g. [Korsgaard 1983; Kagan
1998; Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000] all of which are reprinted in
[Rønnow-Rasmussen & Zimmermann 2005].
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valuable for its own sake. For instance, it is widely acknowledged
that happiness is finally valuable. In contrast, for something to have
instrumental value is for it have value as a means to an end. For in-
stance, it is widely acknowledged that money is instrumentally valu-
able, at least in the kinds of society we live in: it allows its possessors
to buy things that enable them to achieve a certain level of comfort
in life.3 The reason everything we say is compatible with the idea
that knowledge is valuable in a way that complies with Riggs’s re-
quirement is that it is compatible with all our claims that knowledge
but not true belief that falls short of knowledge is finally valuable. If
so, every item of knowledge is more valuable (and indeed enjoys a
different kind of value) than the corresponding true belief that isn’t
knowledge.
That said, for the purposes of this paper, we’d like to bracket re-
sponses to the challenges in terms of the final value of knowledge
and focus on responses in terms of instrumental value instead. Curi-
ously, once we are clear that we are aiming for this kind of response,
the prospects of success look somewhat dim. The reason for this
is that, when focusing solely on instrumental value, some items of
knowledge appear to be of no value whatsoever. (Let’s call items
of knowledge that have no instrumental value whatsoever items of
‘useless knowledge’.) Knowing the exact number of grains of sand
in the jar you brought back from last year’s summer holiday is but
one popular example [e.g. Sosa 2003]. If some items of knowledge
are useless, however, they are no more valuable than the correspond-
ing beliefs that fall short of knowledge, which are useless as well. A
satisfactory response to C1 and C2 appears no longer available.
3 Traditionally, final value was thought to be the same as intrinsic value, i.e.
value that accrues to something in virtue of its intrinsic properties only. Moreover,
intrinsic value was thought to contrast with instrumental value. However, there
has been a growing consensus in recent value theory that final value need not be
intrinsic. A famous example of final extrinsic value is that of Princess Diana’s
dress, which is valuable for its own sake, but derives this value at least in part
from its relationship to Princess Diana [Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000:
121]. Similarly, some have argued that instrumental value is not the only kind of
non-final value. Michael Zimmermann [2015: §6] considers the case of a medical
test the results of which indicate that the patient is in good health. Zimmerman
notes that it is not implausible to say that, in this case, the results are also good. In
contrast with good health, which is arguably finally valuable, the positive results
are not valuable for their own sake and hence are not finally valuable. What’s more,
the good results are not a means to good health either and so aren’t instrumentally
valuable. As a result, the type of value that attaches to the results has to be non-
final non-instrumental value.
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On the other hand, recall that C1 and C2 are to be motivated by
our concern with knowledge. That is to say, we wanted an account of
the value of knowledge that explains our concern with knowledge.
If so, however, it is far less evident that a satisfactory account of the
value of knowledge must satisfy Riggs’s requirement. After all, our
concern with knowledge does not appear to extend to all items of
knowledge. In particular, we seem to have little concern for items of
useless knowledge—and, we want to add, rightly so. If so, examples
of useless knowledge are best understood as suggesting that a sat-
isfactory account of the value of knowledge need not satisfy Riggs’s
requirement.
Once we abandon Riggs’s requirement, we might attempt to re-
place it by a weaker requirement. Rather than venturing to show
that each item of knowledge is more valuable than the corresponding
mere true belief, we might think that it will do to show that enough
items of knowledge are more valuable than the corresponding beliefs
that aren’t knowledge. We may try to rise to this challenge in at least
two ways. First, we may try to explain the value of knowledge in
terms of a property (or properties) of individual items of knowledge.
While we do not mean to deny that this is a promising line to pur-
sue, in what follows we’d like to explore a different approach, which
starts from the thesis that knowledge is a commodity and aims to
explain the special value of knowledge in terms of a property of the
commodity.
3 The Value of Knowledge
3.1 Commodity Value
‘Knowledge’ is a mass term, like ‘water’. It is widely agreed, how-
ever, that mass terms denote stuff that can be measured but not
counted.4 In the case of knowledge and water the stuff is a kind
4 Pelletier [2010: 128]. Pelletier also points out that mass terms are generally
regarded to have divisive and cumulative reference: one can subdivide the stuff
to which a mass term can be correctly applied infinitely and the mass terms will
continue to be correctly applicable to its parts (divisive reference) and one can add
as much of the stuff to an existing quantity of it as one likes and the term will
continue to be correctly applicable to the resulting mass (cumulative reference).
One might think that this is implausible for knowledge. After all, if we take away
the justification component from a bunch of beliefs that make up some quantity of
knowledge, for instance, ‘knowledge’ won’t be correctly applicable to the resulting
mass. But notice that this is not a special problem for ‘knowledge’. After all, if
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of commodity—something one can have more or less of.5 Now sup-
pose that it can be shown that the commodity of knowledge has spe-
cial value, that an account of the value of the commodity can be given
that satisfies C1 and C2. There is reason to believe that this will also
be sufficient to adequately meet these challenges. After all, an ac-
count of the value of the commodity would make good sense of our
concern with knowledge. What’s more, if we did succeed in pro-
viding an account of the value of the commodity of knowledge we
would still stand as a good chance as any of vindicating the special
focus on knowledge in the history of epistemology. For that reason,
it seems that everything is to be gained and nothing to be lost by
exploring the prospects for an account of the value of the commodity
of knowledge.
Before moving on to the value of the commodity of knowledge,
we’d like to take a look at the value of another central commod-
ity in our lives, to wit, water. Water is of course valuable in many
respects. For the purposes of this paper, we’d like focus on one valu-
able quality of water, its power to quench our thirst. Suppose liquid
hydrogen were just as well suited to quench our thirst as is water.
The constituents of liquid hydrogen, H2, are a proper subset of the
constituents of water, H2O (so that liquid hydrogen stands to wa-
ter as, for instance, justified true belief stands to knowledge.) Now
suppose you have before you two glasses, one containing water, the
other liquid hydrogen. It is plausible that the glass with water is no
more valuable than the glass with liquid hydrogen, at least not with
respect to its power to quench your thirst. After all, ex hypothesi, liq-
uid hydrogen is as well suited to do the job as water is. Does that
mean that water, the commodity, couldn’t have special value, value
that warrants our concern with water? No. To see this, suppose (as
happens to be the case) that liquid hydrogen is extremely rare and
can exists only in very special environments. Suppose that, at the
same time, water is easily available in a wide range of places and to
you chop up some water molecules that make up a quantity of water and take
away the oxygen atoms, say, ‘water’ won’t be correctly applicable to the resulting
mass either. Pelletier [2010: 129] suggests that this problem may be solved by
distinguishing between metaphysical and semantic facts. The thought is that while
as a matter of metaphysical fact water consists of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, this
is not recognised semantically, at least not in English. Whether or not this solution
works need not concern us here. After all, so long as the problem is not exclusive
to ‘knowledge’, we can, for present purposes at least, safely ignore it.
5 See [Treanor 2013, 2014] for a view similar to this as well as an illuminating
account of how one might measure amounts of knowledge.
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a wide range of people. In that case water is plausibly valuable to us
in a way that would warrant our concern with it. What makes water
thus valuable is not just the fact that it has the power to quench our
thirst. After all, we are supposing that water shares this property
with liquid hydrogen. It is a combination of the fact that it has this
property and the fact that it is so widely and easily available. To put
a snappy label to it, water is of special value because it is our way of
quenching our thirst.
Now, we want to suggest that the situation is in essence the same
with knowledge on the one hand and true belief that falls short of
knowledge on the other. One valuable property of knowledge is that
it is a way of correctly representing the world around us. It is undeni-
able that the same holds for true belief that falls short of knowledge.
Now compare two agents, A and B, such that A knows that p and B
truly believes but doesn’t know that p. It is very plausible that A’s
belief that p is no more valuable than B’s, at least not with respect
to its correctly representing the world—just as it is very plausible, in
the imagined case above, that the glass of water is no more valuable
with respect to thirst-quenching than the glass of liquid hydrogen.
Arguably, however, just as in the case of water and liquid hydrogen,
this result is compatible with knowledge being valuable in a way that
would warrant our concern with it. In fact, the very same properties
that account for the special value of water in the imagined case ac-
count for the corresponding special value of knowledge: in a wide
range of areas, knowledge is widely and readily available.
To see this, consider first perceptual beliefs about middle-sized
dry goods. On any non-sceptical account of knowledge, given forma-
tion by suitable processes (alternatively: on suitable grounds) in suf-
ficiently hospitable epistemic environments, these beliefs will qualify
as knowledge. For instance, my belief that there is a computer on the
desk before me qualifies as knowledge: it is produced by a highly
reliable ability to recognise tables in an epistemically hospitable en-
vironment. Now the crucial point is that, for beliefs in this range,
formation by suitable processes in hospitable environments is the
norm; formation of beliefs by unsuitable process, or in inhospitable
environments is the exception. If this isn’t immediately clear, con-
sider again my belief that there is a computer on the desk before me
and ask yourself what would have to be the case for my belief to
remain true but fall short of knowledge. Those with some training
in epistemology will find it easy to answer this question: I mistake a
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hologram for a computer, whilst unbeknownst to me there is a com-
puter somewhere else on the desk, I acquire my belief by a highly
unreliable process such as a coin-toss, etc. While any of this might
come to pass, it is undeniable that, as a matter of fact, it only rarely
does. For that reason, cases of knowledge are the norm and cases of
true belief that fall short of knowledge are the exception.
Perceptual beliefs about middle-sized dry goods are not the only
cases in point. Consider testimonial belief about propositions of cru-
cial practical importance in our lives: propositions about bills that
need to be payed, the nature of the sickness of your child and the
medication that will cure it, what’s available at the local restaurant,
etc. Or consider inferentially supported beliefs that exploit a variety
of natural and social regularities: that my car is still parked outside
the institute, that Cameron is still the prime minister of the UK, etc.
Here too, when beliefs in these ranges are formed by suitable pro-
cesses in sufficiently hospitable epistemic environments, they will
qualify as knowledge. Here too, cases of knowledge are norm and
cases of true belief that fall short of knowledge are the exception.
These considerations suggest that, in wide range of cases, knowl-
edge is widely and readily available. All we have to do to acquire
knowledge is open our eyes, listen to what other people tell us, at-
tend to our feelings, etc. In comparison, in those areas true belief
that falls short of knowledge is a rare commodity that exists only in
very special environments. In parallel with the case of water, then,
what makes knowledge specially valuable is not just the fact that it
involves a correct representation of the world. It is the fact that it
has this property in combination with the fact that, in a wide range
of areas, it is so widely and easily available. Just as water is of spe-
cial value because it is our way of quenching our thirst, knowledge
is of special value because, in a wide range of areas, it is our way of
correctly representing the world.6
Before moving on, we’d briefly like to say a few words about what
exactly the proposed account of the special value of the commodity of
knowledge amounts to. To this end, we’d like to return once more to
the parallel account of the special value of the commodity of water.
In particular, we’d like to point out that, on the present account,
6 One could point out that we tend to attach higher value to scarce commodities
than to readily available ones. However, it is not market value that is at stake
here; it is instrumental value related to our epistemic goals. Analogously, while
the market value of truffles is higher than that of bread, it is undeniable that, due
to its ready availability, bread is more instrumentally valuable for our survival.
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the surplus value of the commodity of water over the commodity
of liquid hydrogen in the society under consideration is contingent
and agent-relative. To see that it is contingent, note that there may be
other possible worlds at which liquid hydrogen exists in abundance
and water is rare. At those worlds, liquid hydrogen may well be more
valuable to members of the counterpart of our society than water. It
is agent-relative because there may be creatures inhabiting the world
of our society for whom liquid hydrogen is more valuable than water,
despite being so rare. One example are creatures who are severely
allergic to any liquids containing oxygen. And, of course, the same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for the value of the commodity of knowledge:
on the proposed account, the surplus value of knowledge over true
belief that falls short of knowledge is contingent and agent-relative.
3.2 Value Inheritance
Suppose that the above account of the value of the commodity of
knowledge is successful. One question that we might ask ourselves at
this stage is what, if anything, this entails for the value of individual
items of knowledge.
One possible answer is that individual items of knowledge inherit
special value from being instances of a specially valuable type and
that, in consequence, individual items of knowledge turn out to be
more valuable than individual items of true beliefs that fall short of
knowledge. (We will henceforth refer to the thesis that tokens of a
valuable type inherit value from the type as ‘Value Inheritance’.)
Now we think that Value Inheritance is most plausible when the
value of the relevant type is final value. For instance, if happiness as
a type of state is finally valuable, one might think that instantiations
of happiness are finally valuable also. At the same time, we said that
we would bracket the issue of final value for the purposes of this
paper. So the crucial question is whether Value Inheritance holds for
instrumental value.
In a recent paper, Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson [2009] argue
for a positive answer. They offer the state of possessing money as a
case in point. The idea is that possessing money is an instrumentally
valuable type of state as it frequently produces states that are finally
valuable (e.g. happiness). Crucially, Goldman and Olsson claim that
“each token of this type inherits instrumental value from the type”
[Goldman & Olsson 2009: 32]. If they are right, Value Inheritance
might still hold for instrumentally valuable types in some cases.
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It may look as though, compatibly with Value Inheritance, Gold-
man and Olsson can allow for the existence of token states of posses-
sion of money that are useless. As they point out, each token state in-
herits value from the type even though they may not actually produce
finally valuable states. In the case of money, this may happen when
the money isn’t spent at all or it is badly invested [Goldman & Olsson
2009: 32]. On reflection, however, it cannot be the case that a token
state of possessing money is genuinely useless (i.e. has zero instru-
mental value) and yet inherits positive instrumental value from the
instrumentally valuable type. One of the two has to go. The question
is which one and why.
Given that Goldman and Olsson accept that Value Inheritance
holds for possessing money, it has to be useless money. What ap-
pears to be going on here is that the value of token states of possess-
ing money resides in a dispositional property—roughly, its power to
bring about something finally valuable (though perhaps only by pro-
ducing something else of instrumental value). Since a dispositional
property can be had even when the disposition is not manifested, if
the value of a token state of possessing money resides in the disposi-
tional property, money can be valuable even when it does not bring
about something of final value. Crucially, however, in that case the
token state is not useless.
But couldn’t there be useless money? We think there could be.
Suppose you own a one hundred Euro bill. Unfortunately, however,
the bill is on an unmanned spaceship that is now in such a remote
part of the universe that it is certain to have disintegrated before it
can reach the next living being. In this case, we submit, the token
state of your owning this bill is useless. There is a rationale behind
this verdict. Even when the instrumental value of a certain item re-
sides in a dispositional property, the item can be useless if there is
no chance at all that the disposition will be manifested. This is what
is happening in (a suitably fleshed out version of) the above case.
There is simply no longer any chance that the money is spent and
hence that the disposition in which the money’s value resides will be
manifested. That’s why the state of your owning the bill in this case
is useless. There is thus reason to believe, pace Goldman and Olsson,
that Value Inheritance does not hold for money.7
7 Goldman and Olsson also offer a second example, namely that of good mo-
tives for actions. The idea is that good motives are a type of state that acquires
value from its relation to good action. Over time, good motives have come to be
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In view of these considerations, we are suspicious of the idea that
Value Inheritance generally holds for instrumental value. This is of
course not to say that Value Inheritance doesn’t often hold in par-
ticular cases. But so long as Value Inheritance does not hold for
instrumental value in general, the proposed account of the value of
knowledge can allow for the possibility of useless knowledge. We’d
also like to emphasise that, while we suspect that Value Inheritance
does not generally hold for instrumental value, we are not wedded
to this idea. On the contrary, we are open to be convinced other-
wise.8 Suppose it can be established that Value Inheritance holds for
all cases in a certain range and that all cases of knowledge are within
that range. All that follows from our account is that individual items
of knowledge are more valuable than the corresponding beliefs that
aren’t knowledge after all. While this would require us to change
our verdicts about the value of beliefs about the number of grains of
sand in some jar and like cases, the result is not unwelcome. After all,
prospects for an alternative explanation of the intuition of zero value
are fairly bright: in the case of knowledge, the value of the type is
often overlooked and, additionally, instrumental value is not always
inherited by tokens of the type. No surprise that the inherited value
could remain unrecognised in the case of knowledge.
valued independently, “in themselves” [Goldman & Olsson 2009: 33] as they put
it. Now, it is not clear to us what exactly Goldman and Olsson mean here. Is it that
good motives come to be valued for their own sake? Whatever the answer to this
question may be, we think that it is very plausible that good motives are valued for
their own sake. As we already pointed out, we are also sympathetic to idea that
Value Inheritance holds when the value of the type is final value. So, we are happy
to grant that Goldman and Olsson have succeeded in identifying a case of Value
Inheritance. It’s just that the case is not of the kind we were looking for. After all,
at least for all Goldman and Olsson have argued, the value inherited here is final,
not instrumental.
8 A promising place to look are normative properties. For instance, possession
of legal tender is a type of state that has the instrumentally valuable normative
property of entitling you meet financial obligations by using it. We think that the
idea that the instrumentally valuable normative property is inherited by each to-
ken of the state type carries promise. If, in addition, knowledge has instrumentally
valuable normative properties, we would have what it takes to argue that knowl-
edge has instrumental value that is inherited by each token item of knowledge.
That said, we will not pursue this line in any more detail here. Suffice it to say that
the instrumental value that we argue attaches to the commodity of knowledge is
not a normative property. Even if Value Inheritance holds for normative properties,
there still is little reason to think that it holds for the properties that, according to
our proposal, make the commodity of knowledge valuable.
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4 Objections and Replies
With our account of the value of knowledge in play, we’d like to dis-
cuss a couple of objections that one might press against our account
of the value of knowledge. The first points to a putative disanalogy
between the case of water and the case of knowledge. In contrast, the
second charges the account of the value of knowledge with being too
thin.
4.1 Disanalogy
One worry one might have is that there is a crucial disanalogy be-
tween the case of water and the case of knowledge. In particular,
one might think that, in the case of water, the following counterfac-
tual is true: “If there hadn’t been any water, we wouldn’t have been
able to quench our thirst, at least not on a global scale.” After all,
there wouldn’t have been enough liquid hydrogen around to do the
trick. In contrast, it might be thought that the parallel counterfactual
for knowledge is not true: “If there hadn’t been any knowledge, we
wouldn’t have been able to correctly represent the world, at least not
on a global scale.” After all, there would still have have been enough
true beliefs around to do the trick. In this respect, then, knowledge
and water are disanalogous. What’s more, the disanalogy is impor-
tant. The truth of the counterfactual is just what makes it plausible
that, in the thought experiment, water is of special value in the first
place. Given that the parallel counterfactual about knowledge isn’t
true, the proposed account of the value of knowledge fails.
We want to make four points by way of response. First, the closest
worlds at which there isn’t any knowledge (or at least not enough to
satisfy our needs for correct representation on a global scale) are very
far off. Knowledge abounds, whilst true belief that isn’t knowledge
is rare not only at the actual world but a good way out into modal
space, well past the boundary even of nearby worlds. That is to say
that knowledge is very robustly our way of correctly representing the
world. Given that this is so, it is less than clear that, even if the coun-
terfactual is indeed false, this compromises the value of knowledge
that, according to our proposal, attaches to knowledge at the actual
world.
Second, we are somewhat suspicious of the idea that if there
hadn’t been any knowledge, there still would have been plenty of
true beliefs around, enough to satisfy our need of correctly repre-
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senting the world on a global scale. The reason for this is that it is
not clear to us that the following counterfactual isn’t true instead:
if there hadn’t been any knowledge, there wouldn’t have been any
beliefs around. Very roughly, the thought here is (i) that many of
our beliefs are formed by processes that were selected for reliably
producing true beliefs and (ii) that had these processes not been reli-
able enough to produce knowledge, we would not have been reliable
enough in finding food, avoiding predators and other dangers etc. to
make it as a species.
Third, suppose we stipulate that, at the world of our thought ex-
periment, water abounds and liquid hydrogen is rare (S1) and that
had water been rare, liquid hydrogen would have abounded (S2) with
the result that the allegedly troublesome counterfactual is false for
water as well. In that case, water is still of special value at the world
of the thought experiment. After all, it is the only resource present
at that world suited to quench our thirst on a global scale. At best,
the counterfactual shows that something else might have been of spe-
cial value instead of water (and would have been had water not been
of special value). Note, however, that this is entirely unproblematic
on the current account as the value of water is acknowledged to be
contingent.
Crucially, the case is exactly the same for knowledge and true
belief that falls short of knowledge at the actual world. Although
knowledge entails true belief and, in consequence, true belief abounds
at the actual world, true belief that falls short of knowledge is not en-
tailed by knowledge—in fact, it excludes knowledge. Even though
knowledge and true belief are abundant at the actual world, true be-
lief that isn’t knowledge is rare. This gives us the analogue of S1. The
counterfactual pressed by the objector is the analogue of S2, i.e. that
if knowledge had been rare, true belief that isn’t knowledge would
have abounded. What we can now see is that even if our objector
is right and the counterfactual is true, our proposed account of the
value of knowledge will still get off the ground. Just as in the case of
water the truth of S2 does not impugn the special value of water at
the world of the thought experiment, the truth of the parallel coun-
terfactual does nothing to impugn the special value of knowledge at
the actual world. After all, just as in the case of water, knowledge
is the only resource present at the actual world suited for correctly
representing the world on a global scale.
Fourth, the case of water/liquid hydrogen at the world of the
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thought experiment and of knowledge/true belief that isn’t knowl-
edge at the actual world is not to be confused with the case of oil/al-
ternative energy sources at the actual world. In the latter case, even
though we use oil to meet our energy-related needs, we might just as
well have used alternative energy sources instead. For that reason, it
might be thought, oil is not of special value at the actual world. Even
if this assessment of the value of oil at the actual world is correct,
there is a crucial difference between this case and the cases of wa-
ter/liquid hydrogen and knowledge/true belief that isn’t knowledge.
After all, in contrast with the cases of water and knowledge, in this
case, the alternative energy sources also abound at the actual world
(alongside oil). This means that oil is not the only resource present
at the relevant world suited to meet our energy-related needs. As a
result, even if we agree that oil is not of special value at a world at
which there are many other resources present suited to do the job of
oil, this does not compromise the plausibility of the thesis that water
and knowledge are of special value at the relevant worlds in virtue
of being the only resources present at the relevant worlds suited to
do the relevant jobs.
4.2 Thinness
Another worry one might have is that the proposed account of the
special value of knowledge is too thin. Recall that the value of knowl-
edge is both contingent and agent-relative. If that’s really all there is
to the value of knowledge, do we genuinely capture the special value
we have long believed knowledge to have?
Here is our response to this worry. First, it is entirely compatible
with the proposed account that there are other ways in which knowl-
edge is valuable. We already mentioned one such alternative, albeit
only to put it aside for the purposes of this paper, to wit, that knowl-
edge is finally valuable. However, there may be even further ways
in which knowledge may be valuable, including alternative ways of
being instrumentally valuable. As a result, it is compatible with our
account that the proposed account does not fully capture the value
we believe knowledge to have. In that case, it doesn’t matter that our
account of the value of knowledge is too thin.9
Second, suppose it turns out that our thin way is the only way
9 Note also that, for water, too, there may be other ways in which it is valu-
able. For instance, it may be that water but not liquid hydrogen is suitable for the
purposes of irrigation.
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in which knowledge is valuable over and above true belief that falls
short of knowledge. Suppose furthermore that our account does not
fully capture the special value we have believed knowledge to have.
In that case, we believe that we have to revise our beliefs about how
special knowledge is. However, it does not detract from the signifi-
cance of the account. Even if knowledge turns out to be less special
than we thought it to be, it will be of some importance to know that it
is in some way better than true belief that falls short of knowledge.10
Third, and relatedly, it is not so clear to us just how special we
believe knowledge to be. It is not even clear to us that there exists
a uniform opinion on the issue. For instance, it might turn out that
epistemologists have believed knowledge to be much more special
than ordinary folk. That said, we do believe that the observation we
started from is pretty solid: as a society we care about knowledge in
the sense that we invest a lot of time and energy in institutions aim-
ing at the accumulation or distribution of knowledge and so on. Even
if our account is too thin to capture the special value some (or even
all) of us may have believed knowledge to have, it will be of consider-
able significance whether or not knowledge is valuable in a way that
vindicates this concern. Crucially, there is reason to think that our
account delivers on this front. To see this, let’s return one more time
to the case of water. Suppose the society under consideration cares
about water in much the same way in which we care about knowl-
edge: it invests a lot of time and energy in institutions investigating
its nature, as well as institutions involved with the management of
water, its sourcing, distribution, quality control and so on. Suppose
it turns out that the only thing that makes water more valuable than
liquid hydrogen is that water is a more widely and readily available
commodity than liquid hydrogen. Even so, this result will vindicate
the society’s concern with water. By way of evidence, note that it
makes sense for them to continue caring about water in the way they
have done: to invest time and energy in institutions investigating its
nature and to be concerned with its management. Moreover, it would
not make sense to significantly alter the way they have cared for wa-
ter. In particular, it would not make sense for them to stop caring
more for water than for liquid hydrogen, to allocate fifty percent of
their resources to research into the nature and management of liquid
hydrogen and so on. In this way, there is reason to believe that the
result concerning the value of water vindicates the society’s concern
10 Again, it is easy to see that the same may hold in the case of water.
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with water. And the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for our concern
with knowledge.
5 The Superiority of Knowledge
5.1 A Third Challenge
In §2 we outlined two challenges that any satisfactory account of
the value of knowledge will have to meet. While these challenges
enjoy rather widespread support, some think that there is a further
condition of adequacy on accounts of the value of knowledge. In
particular, Duncan Pritchard argues that a satisfactory account of the
value of knowledge must, in addition, show that knowledge enjoys a
different kind of value than true belief that falls short of knowledge.
According to Pritchard, then,
[C3*] Any satisfactory account of the value of knowledge must explain
why knowledge is in some respect more valuable than any proper
subset of its constituents not just as a matter of degree but as a matter of
kind [Pritchard et al. 2010: 7-8].
On the account developed in §3, knowledge is valuable because
it is our way of correctly representing the world. Note that this will
serve to address the challenges from §2 (C1, C2) as it explains why
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and more valuable
than beliefs that fall short of knowledge. At the same time, it is
not hard to see that our account does precious little to address C3*,
according to which knowledge must have a different kind of value
than beliefs that fall short of knowledge. For that reason, we’d now
like to take a closer look at Pritchard’s challenge.
First, we’d like to express a worry about the challenge. Suppose
it can be shown that knowledge is finally valuable. In that case,
it would seem that we have everything we could hope for. By the
same token, any plausible challenge for an account of the value of
knowledge should at this stage be met. Unfortunately, there is no
guarantee that C3* will be met. To see this, suppose that true belief
turns out to be finally valuable as well. Given, additionally, that
all other kinds of value are equally shared between true belief and
knowledge, there will no kind of value that attaches to knowledge
that does not attach to true belief that isn’t knowledge. C3* will
not be met. As a result, there is reason to believe that C3* is too
demanding.
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At the same time, we think that Pritchard may have been on to
something when he introduced C3*. To see this, let’s take a look at
how he motivates it:
[I]f one regards knowledge as being more valuable than that
which falls short of knowledge merely as a matter of degree
rather than kind, then this has the effect of putting knowledge
on a kind of continuum of value with regard to the epistemic,
albeit further up the continuum than anything that falls short of
knowledge. The problem with this ‘continuum’ account of the
value of knowledge, however, is that it fails to explain why the
long history of epistemological discussion has focused specif-
ically on the stage in this continuum of value that knowledge
marks rather than some other stage (such as a stage just before
the one marked out by knowledge, or just after). Accordingly,
it seems that accounting for our intuitions about the value of
knowledge requires us to offer an explanation of why knowl-
edge has not just a greater degree but also a different kind of
value than whatever falls short of knowledge.
[Pritchard et al. 2010: 7-8]
What becomes clear here is that Pritchard takes it, first, that no ac-
count of the value of knowledge on which it is on a continuum with
the value of true belief that isn’t knowledge can be successful. He
also seems to think, second, that the only way in which we can avoid
placing knowledge on such a continuum is by showing that knowl-
edge enjoys a different kind of value.
Importantly, the second claim is false. Even if a difference in kind
of value is sufficient to get knowledge off the value continuum with
true belief that falls short of knowledge, it isn’t necessary. There are
other ways in which one type of good, A, can be discontinuous in
value with another type of good, B. For instance, it may be (i) that
any amount of A is better than any amount of B (henceforth also
‘Strong Superiority’) or (ii) that some amount of A is better than any
amount of B (henceforth also ‘Weak Superiority’). Mill famously put
forth such a discontinuous account of value relations:
It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise
the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
valuable than others. – Of two pleasures, if [ . . . ] one of the two
is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed
so far above the other that they [ . . . ] would not resign it for
any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable
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of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render
it, in comparison, of small account.
[Mill 1963: 210]
Both Strong and Weak Superiority will take knowledge off a value
continuum with true belief that isn’t knowledge. At the same time,
neither requires a difference in kind between these two.
It comes to light that, even though C3* is arguably too demand-
ing, Pritchard’s motivations for C3* may still justify a condition of
adequacy for accounts of the value of knowledge over and above C1
and C2, to wit:
[C3] Any satisfactory account of the value of knowledge must show that
knowledge is not on a value continuum with true belief that falls short
of knowledge.
Crucially, even if showing that knowledge enjoys a different kind of
value than true belief that falls short of knowledge is sufficient to
meet C3, it is not necessary. Rather, to rise to C3 it will be enough
to show that knowledge is, in some respect, at least weakly superior
to true belief that falls short of knowledge. That is to say, we need
to show, at a minimum, that some amount of knowledge is in some
respect better than any amount of true belief.
5.2 Eudaimonic Value
While we aren’t certain that even C3 constitutes a reasonable demand
on adequate accounts of the value of knowledge, in the remainder of
this section we want to try and provide some support for the claim
that knowledge is weakly superior to true belief that isn’t knowledge.
We take this part of the paper to be rather speculative: a sketch of
an argument that it may be worth pursuing in more detail elsewhere
rather than a thorough defence. Roughly, the idea is that a certain
amount of knowledge is required to achieve one of the highest goods
in life: human flourishing or what Aristotle called ‘eudaimonia’. Eu-
daimonia is a type of happiness. Crucially, however, it is not happi-
ness of any old sort. As Rosalind Hursthouse points out, eudaimonia
is “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” [2007: §2]
We will assume that a eudaimonic life is at least weakly superior
to a life without eudaimonia. To put it in Mills’s terms, no one fully
acquainted with both lives would sacrifice a eudaimonic life for a life
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without it, no matter how good the non-eudaimonic life may be in
other respects. Derek Parfit nicely illustrates the spirit of this idea in
the following passage:
I could live for another 100 years, all of an extremely high qual-
ity. Call this the Century of Ecstasy. I could instead live forever,
with a life that would always be barely worth living [ . . . ] the
only good things would be muzak and potatoes. Call this the
Drab Eternity. I claim that, though each day of the Drab Eter-
nity would be worth living, the Century of Ecstasy would give
me a better life. Though each day of the Drab Eternity would
have some value for me, no amount of this value could be as
good for me as the Century of Ecstasy.
[Parfit 1984: 17-18]
Now suppose it can be shown that a eudaimonic life requires a
certain amount of knowledge and that no amount of true belief that
falls short of knowledge will do the trick. In that case, knowledge
will also be weakly superior to true belief that isn’t knowledge. After
all, there will be an amount of knowledge that cannot be sacrificed
for any amount of true belief that falls short of knowledge without
losing something of superior value, to wit, the eudaimonic life.
To see how it works, let’s first take a closer look at the eudaimonic
life. Human beings are multi-faceted creatures leading complex intel-
lectual, emotional and physical lives. Humans can attain flourishing
in each of these domains. We believe that to attain a life of eudai-
monia, one must attain flourishing in all of them. A human being
leading a flourishing physical and intellectual life may fall short of
a eudaimonic life if s/he does not attain a flourishing emotional life
and so on.11
We want to suggest that one important condition on flourishing
in a given domain consists in sufficiently realizing one’s potential in
that domain. There are of course many ways in which one can fail
to sufficiently realize one’s potential in a given domain. Perhaps the
most obvious one is to systematically and dramatically fail to attain
what one should and could very easily have attained. Consider stay-
ing in reasonable physical shape. It is plausible that this is a goal
11 Note that this is not to say that attaining flourishing life in a given domain
involves an exceptionally high degree of flourishing in that domain. It also doesn’t
mean that one has to attain equal degrees of flourishing in all domains or that a
eudaimonic life will be out of the question for anyone who attains significantly
different degrees of flourishing in some of these domains.
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that human agents should attain. Now consider an agent who has
been gifted with a naturally fit physique. It is very easy for him to
stay in shape. All he needs to do is keep to a minimally healthy
diet and work out twice a week for a mere 15 minutes. However,
he systematically and dramatically fails on this front with the result
that he ends up pathologically obese and has to suffer all the physi-
cal impediments that accompany pathological obesity. There can be
no question that this agent does not attain a life of physical flour-
ishing. Moreover, given that physical flourishing is required for the
eudaimonic life, this agent will also fall short of eudaimonia.
The same goes for the intellectual domain. That is to say, in order
to attain intellectual flourishing one must sufficiently realize one’s
potential in that domain. Again, one way of failing to sufficiently
realize one’s potential in this domain is to systematically and dra-
matically fail to attain what one should and could very easily have
attained. Now recall that knowledge is widely and easily available
to us human beings in a wide range of areas. As a result, in these
areas we humans often have the ability to know, knowledge is within
our reach as intellectual agents. What’s more, it is also plausible that
among the things that it is easy for us to know, there is a wide range
of things that we should know. If so, any human being who sys-
tematically and dramatically fails to attain knowledge that he could
easily have attained will systematically and dramatically fail to attain
knowledge of things in that range. As a result, any such human will
fall short of sufficiently realizing his potential in the intellectual do-
main and so will fail to attain a life of intellectual flourishing. Given
that a life of eudaimonia requires flourishing in all of the above men-
tioned domains, including the intellectual, any human agent who
systematically and dramatically fails to attain knowledge s/he could
easily have attained will be precluded from a life of eudaimonia. For
us humans, then, the eudaimonic life is a life rich (enough) in knowl-
edge.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that knowledge is more valuable than
any proper subset of its constituents because, in a wide range of ar-
eas, knowledge is widely and readily available. Knowledge is our
way of correctly representing the world. In this way, we have ad-
dressed two important challenges that any satisfactory account of the
value of knowledge will have to come to terms with, to wit, C1 and
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C2. While we believe that Pritchard’s additional challenge, C3*, is too
strong, we granted Pritchard that the motivations for C3* he adduced
might still serve to justify a demand on satisfactory accounts of the
value of knowledge over and above C1 and C2, to wit, that knowl-
edge must be taken off a value continuum with true belief that falls
short of knowledge (C3). We provided some reason to think that C3
can be met as well by sketching an argument that life insufficiently
rich in knowledge will not be a eudaimonic life.
References
Goldman, A., & Olsson, E. 2009. Reliabilism and the value of knowl-
edge. In: Haddock, A., Millar, A., & Pritchard, D. (eds), Epistemic
Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hazlett, A. 2010. The myth of factive verbs. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research, 80, 497–522.
Hursthouse, R. 2007. Virtue ethics. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, july 2007 edn.
Kagan, S. 1998. Rethinking intrinsic value. Journal of Ethics, 2, 277–
297.
Korsgaard, C. 1983. Two distinctions in value. Philosophical Review,
92(2), 169–195.
Kvanvig, J. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understand-
ing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. 1996. Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
74, 549–567.
Mill, J.S. 1963. Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society. The Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pelletier, F.J. 2010. Mass Terms: A Philosophical Introduction. In:
Pelletier, F.J. (ed), Kinds, Things, and Stuff. Mass Terms and Generics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21
Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A. 2010. The Nature and Value of
Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, W., & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. 2000. A distinction in
value: Intrinsic and for its own sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 100, 31–53.
Radford, C. 1966. Knowledge–by examples. Analysis, 27, 1–11.
Riggs, W. 2009. Understanding, knowledge, and the Meno require-
ment. In: Haddock, A., Millar A. Pritchard D. (ed), Epistemic Value.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., & Zimmermann, M. (eds). 2005. Recent Work
on Intrinsic Value. Dordrecht: Springer.
Sosa, E. 2003. The place of truth in epistemology. In: DePaul, Michael,
& Zagzebski, Linda (eds), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics
and Epistemology. OUP.
Treanor, N. 2013. The measure of knowledge. Noûs, 47, 577–601.
Treanor, N. 2014. Trivial truths and the aim of inquiry. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 89, 552–59.
Zimmermann, M. 2015. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value. In: Zalta, E.N.
(ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2015 edn.
22
